Integrity attestation of attestation component

ABSTRACT

An attestation component to make attestations about itself to a relying party. The attestation component offers identity attestations of a particular decentralized identity, and manages use of a private key of that decentralized identity. However, the attestation component also has its own private key that is different than the private key of the decentralized identity for which it offers attestations. As an example, the attestation component might, using its own private key, provide an integrity attestation from which an integrity with which the attestation component has managed the private key of the decentralized identity may be determined. Based on this integrity attestation, a relying party can determine whether to trust other attestations provided by the attestation component on behalf of the decentralized identity.

BACKGROUND

Most currently used documents or records that prove identity are issuedby centralized organizations, such as governments, schools, employers,or other service centers or regulatory organizations. Theseorganizations often maintain every member's identity in a centralizedidentity management system. A centralized identity management system isa centralized information system used for organizations to manage theissued identities, their authentication, authorization, roles andprivileges. Centralized identity management systems have been deemed assecure since they often use professionally maintained hardware andsoftware. Typically, the identity issuing organization sets the termsand requirements for registering people with the organization. When aparty needs to verify another party's identity, the verifying partyoften needs to go through the centralized identity management system toobtain information verifying and/or authenticating the other party'sidentity.

Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) are a new type of identifier, which areindependent from any centralized registry, identity provider, orcertificate authority. Distributed ledger technology (such asblockchain) provides the opportunity for using fully decentralizedidentifiers. Distributed ledger technology uses globally distributedledgers to record transactions between two or more parties in averifiable way. Once a transaction is recorded, the data in the sectionof ledger cannot be altered retroactively without the alteration of allsubsequent sections of ledger, which provides a fairly secure platform.Since a DID is generally not controlled by a centralized managementsystem but rather is owned by an owner of the DID, DIDs are sometimesreferred to as identities without authority.

The subject matter claimed herein is not limited to embodiments thatsolve any disadvantages or that operate only in environments such asthose described above. Rather, this background is only provided toillustrate one exemplary technology area where some embodiments describeherein may be practiced.

BRIEF SUMMARY

This Summary is provided to introduce a selection of concepts in asimplified form that are further described below in the DetailedDescription. This Summary is not intended to identify key features oressential features of the claimed subject matter, nor is it intended tobe used as an aid in determining the scope of the claimed subjectmatter.

Embodiments disclosed herein allow an attestation component to makeattestations about itself to a relying party. The attestation componentoffers identity attestations of a particular decentralized identity, andmanages use of a private key of that decentralized identity. However, inaccordance with the principles described herein, the attestationcomponent has its own private key that is different than the private keyof the decentralized identity for which the attestation component offersattestations. As an example, the attestation component might provide anintegrity attestation from which an integrity with which the attestationcomponent has managed the private key of the decentralized identity maybe determined. Based on this integrity attestation, a relying party candetermine whether to trust other attestations provided by theattestation component on behalf of the decentralized identity.

The attestation component cryptographically secures the attestation ofthe attestation component with the private key of the attestationcomponent. Upon determining that an attestation of the attestationcomponent is to be provided, the cryptographically secured identityattestation of the attestation component is caused to be provided to therelying party. Thus, the relying party (e.g., another computing system)may make an informed decision about whether to trust the otherattestations made by the attestation component. For instance, if theattestation component has insecure mechanisms for guarding againstaccess to the private key of the decentralized identity, the relyingparty might ignore other attestations that the attestation componentmakes for the decentralized identity. On the other hand, if theattestation component has fastidiously guarded against tampering of thatprivate key, the relying party might trust the attestations that theattestation component makes for the decentralized identity. Thus, theprinciples described herein allow for better security (or at least moreappropriate decisions regarding attestation reliance) in the context ofa decentralized identity domain.

Additional features and advantages will be set forth in the descriptionwhich follows, and in part will be obvious from the description, or maybe learned by the practice of the teachings herein. Features andadvantages of the invention may be realized and obtained by means of theinstruments and combinations particularly pointed out in the appendedclaims. Features of the present invention will become more fullyapparent from the following description and appended claims, or may belearned by the practice of the invention as set forth hereinafter.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

In order to describe the manner in which the above-recited and otheradvantages and features can be obtained, a more particular descriptionof the subject matter briefly described above will be rendered byreference to specific embodiments which are illustrated in the appendeddrawings. Understanding that these drawings depict only typicalembodiments and are not therefore to be considered to be limiting inscope, embodiments will be described and explained with additionalspecificity and details through the use of the accompanying drawings inwhich:

FIG. 1 illustrates an example computing system in which the principlesdescribed herein may be employed;

FIG. 2 illustrates an example environment for creating a decentralizedidentification (DID);

FIG. 3 illustrates an example environment for various DID managementoperations and services;

FIG. 4 illustrates an example decentralized storage device or identityhubs;

FIG. 5 illustrates an environment in which an attestation componentattests concerning identity information of a decentralized identity andthe attestation component itself to a relying party, in accordance withthe principles described herein;

FIG. 6 illustrates a flowchart of a method for attesting concerningidentity information of an attestation component to a relying party, inaccordance with the principles described herein;

FIG. 7 illustrates a flowchart of a method for providing an identityattestation of the decentralized identity to a relying party; and

FIG. 8 illustrates that an identity attestation of the attestationcomponent is signed by the private key of the attestation component togenerate the signed identity attestation of the attestation component,and that this in combination with the identity attestation of thedecentralized identity is then signed by the private key of thedecentralized identity, in accordance with one embodiment describedherein.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Embodiments disclosed herein allow an attestation component to makeattestations about itself to a relying party. The attestation componentoffers identity attestations of a particular decentralized identity, andmanages use of a private key of that decentralized identity. However, inaccordance with the principles described herein, the attestationcomponent has its own private key that is different than the private keyof the decentralized identity for which the attestation component offersattestations. As an example, the attestation component might provide anintegrity attestation from which an integrity with which the attestationcomponent has managed the private key of the decentralized identity maybe determined. Based on this integrity attestation, a relying party candetermine whether to trust other attestations provided by theattestation component on behalf of the decentralized identity.

The attestation component cryptographically secures the attestation ofthe attestation component with the private key of the attestationcomponent. Upon determining that an attestation of the attestationcomponent is to be provided, the cryptographically secured identityattestation of the attestation component is caused to be provided to therelying party. Thus, the relying party (e.g., another computing system)may make an informed decision about whether to trust the otherattestations made by the attestation component. For instance, if theattestation component has insecure mechanisms for guarding againstaccess to the private key of the decentralized identity, the relyingparty might ignore other attestations that the attestation componentmakes for the decentralized identity. On the other hand, if theattestation component has fastidiously guarded against tampering of thatprivate key, the relying party might trust the attestations that theattestation component makes for the decentralized identity. Thus, theprinciples described herein allow for better security (or at least moreappropriate decisions regarding attestation reliance) in the context ofa decentralized identity domain.

Because the principles described herein may be performed in the contextof a computing system, some introductory discussion of a computingsystem will be described with respect to FIG. 1. Then, this descriptionwill return to the principles of the DID platform with respect to theremaining figures.

Computing systems are now increasingly taking a wide variety of forms.Computing systems may, for example, be handheld devices, appliances,laptop computers, desktop computers, mainframes, distributed computingsystems, data centers, or even devices that have not conventionally beenconsidered a computing system, such as wearables (e.g., glasses). Inthis description and in the claims, the term “computing system” isdefined broadly as including any device or system (or a combinationthereof) that includes at least one physical and tangible processor, anda physical and tangible memory capable of having thereoncomputer-executable instructions that may be executed by a processor.The memory may take any form and may depend on the nature and form ofthe computing system. A computing system may be distributed over anetwork environment and may include multiple constituent computingsystems.

As illustrated in FIG. 1, in its most basic configuration, a computingsystem 100 typically includes at least one hardware processing unit 102and memory 104. The processing unit 102 may include a general-purposeprocessor and may also include a field programmable gate array (FPGA),an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or any otherspecialized circuit. The memory 104 may be physical system memory, whichmay be volatile, non-volatile, or some combination of the two. The term“memory” may also be used herein to refer to non-volatile mass storagesuch as physical storage media. If the computing system is distributed,the processing, memory and/or storage capability may be distributed aswell.

The computing system 100 also has thereon multiple structures oftenreferred to as an “executable component”. For instance, the memory 104of the computing system 100 is illustrated as including executablecomponent 106. The term “executable component” is the name for astructure that is well understood to one of ordinary skill in the art inthe field of computing as being a structure that can be software,hardware, or a combination thereof. For instance, when implemented insoftware, one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that thestructure of an executable component may include software objects,routines, methods, and so forth, that may be executed on the computingsystem, whether such an executable component exists in the heap of acomputing system, or whether the executable component exists oncomputer-readable storage media.

In such a case, one of ordinary skill in the art will recognize that thestructure of the executable component exists on a computer-readablemedium such that, when interpreted by one or more processors of acomputing system (e.g., by a processor thread), the computing system iscaused to perform a function. Such structure may be computer readabledirectly by the processors (as is the case if the executable componentwere binary). Alternatively, the structure may be structured to beinterpretable and/or compiled (whether in a single stage or in multiplestages) so as to generate such binary that is directly interpretable bythe processors. Such an understanding of example structures of anexecutable component is well within the understanding of one of ordinaryskill in the art of computing when using the term “executablecomponent”.

The term “executable component” is also well understood by one ofordinary skill as including structures, such as hard coded or hard wiredlogic gates, that are implemented exclusively or near-exclusively inhardware, such as within a field programmable gate array (FPGA), anapplication specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or any other specializedcircuit. Accordingly, the term “executable component” is a term for astructure that is well understood by those of ordinary skill in the artof computing, whether implemented in software, hardware, or acombination. In this description, the terms “component”, “agent”,“manager”, “service”, “engine”, “module”, “virtual machine” or the likemay also be used. As used in this description and in the case, theseterms (whether expressed with or without a modifying clause) are alsointended to be synonymous with the term “executable component”, and thusalso have a structure that is well understood by those of ordinary skillin the art of computing.

In the description that follows, embodiments are described withreference to acts that are performed by one or more computing systems.If such acts are implemented in software, one or more processors (of theassociated computing system that performs the act) direct the operationof the computing system in response to having executedcomputer-executable instructions that constitute an executablecomponent. For example, such computer-executable instructions may beembodied on one or more computer-readable media that form a computerprogram product. An example of such an operation involves themanipulation of data. If such acts are implemented exclusively ornear-exclusively in hardware, such as within a FPGA or an ASIC, thecomputer-executable instructions may be hard-coded or hard-wired logicgates. The computer-executable instructions (and the manipulated data)may be stored in the memory 104 of the computing system 100. Computingsystem 100 may also contain communication channels 108 that allow thecomputing system 100 to communicate with other computing systems over,for example, network 110.

While not all computing systems require a user interface, in someembodiments, the computing system 100 includes a user interface system112 for use in interfacing with a user. The user interface system 112may include output mechanisms 112A as well as input mechanisms 112B. Theprinciples described herein are not limited to the precise outputmechanisms 112A or input mechanisms 112B as such will depend on thenature of the device. However, output mechanisms 112A might include, forinstance, speakers, displays, tactile output, virtual or augmentedreality, holograms and so forth. Examples of input mechanisms 112B mightinclude, for instance, microphones, touchscreens, virtual or augmentedreality, holograms, cameras, keyboards, mouse or other pointer input,sensors of any type, and so forth.

Embodiments described herein may comprise or utilize a special-purposeor general-purpose computing system including computer hardware, suchas, for example, one or more processors and system memory, as discussedin greater detail below. Embodiments described herein also includephysical and other computer-readable media for carrying or storingcomputer-executable instructions and/or data structures. Suchcomputer-readable media can be any available media that can be accessedby a general-purpose or special-purpose computing system.Computer-readable media that store computer-executable instructions arephysical storage media. Computer-readable media that carrycomputer-executable instructions are transmission media. Thus, by way ofexample, and not limitation, embodiments of the invention can compriseat least two distinctly different kinds of computer-readable media:storage media and transmission media.

Computer-readable storage media includes RAM, ROM, EEPROM, CD-ROM, orother optical disk storage, magnetic disk storage, or other magneticstorage devices, or any other physical and tangible storage medium whichcan be used to store desired program code means in the form ofcomputer-executable instructions or data structures and which can beaccessed by a general-purpose or special-purpose computing system.

A “network” is defined as one or more data links that enable thetransport of electronic data between computing systems and/or modulesand/or other electronic devices. When information is transferred orprovided over a network or another communications connection (eitherhardwired, wireless, or a combination of hardwired or wireless) to acomputing system, the computing system properly views the connection asa transmission medium. Transmission media can include a network and/ordata links which can be used to carry desired program code means in theform of computer-executable instructions or data structures and whichcan be accessed by a general-purpose or special-purpose computingsystem. Combinations of the above should also be included within thescope of computer-readable media.

Further, upon reaching various computing system components, program codemeans in the form of computer-executable instructions or data structurescan be transferred automatically from transmission media to storagemedia (or vice versa). For example, computer-executable instructions ordata structures received over a network or data link can be buffered inRANI within a network interface module (e.g, a “NIC”), and then beeventually transferred to computing system RAM and/or to less volatilestorage media at a computing system. Thus, it should be understood thatstorage media can be included in computing system components that also(or even primarily) utilize transmission media.

Computer-executable instructions comprise, for example, instructions anddata which, when executed at a processor, cause a general-purposecomputing system, special-purpose computing system, or special-purposeprocessing device to perform a certain function or group of functions.Alternatively, or in addition, the computer-executable instructions mayconfigure the computing system to perform a certain function or group offunctions. The computer executable instructions may be, for example,binaries or even instructions that undergo some translation (such ascompilation) before direct execution by the processors, such asintermediate format instructions such as assembly language, or evensource code.

Although the subject matter has been described in language specific tostructural features and/or methodological acts, it is to be understoodthat the subject matter defined in the appended claims is notnecessarily limited to the described features or acts described above.Rather, the described features and acts are disclosed as example formsof implementing the claims.

Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the invention may bepracticed in network computing environments with many types of computingsystem configurations, including, personal computers, desktop computers,laptop computers, message processors, hand-held devices, multi-processorsystems, microprocessor-based or programmable consumer electronics,network PCs, minicomputers, mainframe computers, mobile telephones,PDAs, pagers, routers, switches, datacenters, wearables (such asglasses) and the like. The invention may also be practiced indistributed system environments where local and remote computing system,which are linked (either by hardwired data links, wireless data links,or by a combination of hardwired and wireless data links) through anetwork, both perform tasks. In a distributed system environment,program modules may be located in both local and remote memory storagedevices.

Those skilled in the art will also appreciate that the invention may bepracticed in a cloud computing environment. Cloud computing environmentsmay be distributed, although this is not required. When distributed,cloud computing environments may be distributed internationally withinan organization and/or have components possessed across multipleorganizations. In this description and the following claims, “cloudcomputing” is defined as a model for enabling on-demand network accessto a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g, networks,servers, storage, applications, and services). The definition of “cloudcomputing” is not limited to any of the other numerous advantages thatcan be obtained from such a model when properly deployed.

The remaining figures may discuss various computing system which maycorrespond to the computing system 100 previously described. Thecomputing systems of the remaining figures include various components orfunctional blocks that may implement the various embodiments disclosedherein as will be explained. The various components or functional blocksmay be implemented on a local computing system or may be implemented ona distributed computing system that includes elements resident in thecloud or that implement aspects of cloud computing. The variouscomponents or functional blocks may be implemented as software,hardware, or a combination of software and hardware. The computingsystems of the remaining figures may include more or less than thecomponents illustrated in the figures and some of the components may becombined as circumstances warrant.

Some introductory discussion of a decentralized identifier (DID) and theenvironment in which they are created and reside will now be given withrespect to FIG. 2. As illustrated in FIG. 2, a DID owner 201 may own orcontrol a DID 205 that represents an identity of the DID owner 201. TheDID owner 201 may register a DID using a creation and registrationservice, which will be explained in more detail below.

The DID owner 201 may be any entity that could benefit from a DID. Forexample, the DID owner 201 may be a human being or an organization ofhuman beings. Such organizations might include a company, department,government, agency, or any other organization or group of organizations.Each individual human being might have a DID while the organization(s)to which each belongs might likewise have a DID.

The DID owner 201 may alternatively be a machine, system, or device, ora collection of machine(s), device(s) and/or system(s). In still otherembodiments, the DID owner 201 may be a subpart of a machine, system ordevice. For instance, a device could be a printed circuit board, wherethe subpart of that circuit board are individual components of thecircuit board. In such embodiments, the machine or device may have a DIDand each subpart may also have a DID. A DID owner might also be asoftware component such as the executable component 106 described abovewith respect to FIG. 1. An example of a complex executable component 106might be an artificial intelligence. Accordingly, an artificialintelligence may also own a DID.

Thus, the DID owner 201 may be any entity, human or non-human, that iscapable of creating the DID 205 or at least having the DID 205 createdfor and/or associated with them. Although the DID owner 201 is shown ashaving a single DID 205, this need not be the case as there may be anynumber of DIDs associated with the DID owner 201 as circumstanceswarrant.

As mentioned, the DID owner 201 may create and register the DID 205. TheDID 205 may be any identifier that may be associated with the DID owner201. Preferably, that identifier is unique to that DID owner 201, atleast within a scope in which the DID is anticipated to be in use. As anexample, the identifier may be a locally unique identifier, and perhapsmore desirably a globally unique identifier for identity systemsanticipated to operate globally. In some embodiments, the DID 205 may bea Uniform Resource identifier (URI) (such as a Uniform Resource Locator(URL)) or other pointer that relates the DID owner 201 to mechanisms toengage in trustable interactions with the DID owner 201.

The DID 205 is “decentralized” because it does not require acentralized, third party management system for generation, management,or use. Accordingly, the DID 205 remains under the control of the DIDowner 201. This is different from conventional centralized IDs whichbase trust on centralized authorities and that remain under control ofcorporate directory services, certificate authorities, domain nameregistries, or other centralized authority (referred to collectively as“centralized authorities” herein). Accordingly, the DID 205 may be anyidentifier that is under the control of the DID owner 201 and that isindependent of any centralized authority.

In some embodiments, the structure of the DID 205 may be as simple as auser name or some other human-understandable term. However, in otherembodiments, for increased security, the DID 205 may preferably be arandom string of numbers and letters. In one embodiment, the DID 205 maybe a string of 128 numbers and letters. Accordingly, the embodimentsdisclosed herein are not dependent on any specific implementation of theDID 205. In a very simple example, the DID 205 is shown within thefigures as “123ABC”.

As also shown in FIG. 2, the DID owner 201 has control of a private key206 and public key 207 pair that is associated with the DID 205. Becausethe DID 205 is independent of any centralized authority, the private key206 should at all times be fully in control of the DID owner 201. Thatis, the private and public keys should be generated in a decentralizedmanner that ensures that they remain under the control of the DID owner201.

As will be described in more detail to follow, the private key 206 andpublic key 207 pair may be generated on a device controlled by the DIDowner 201. The private key 206 and public key 207 pair should not begenerated on a server controlled by any centralized authority as thismay cause the private key 206 and public key 207 pair to not be fullyunder the control of the DID owner 201 at all times. Although FIG. 2 andthis description have described a private and public key pair, it willalso be noted that other types of reasonable cryptographic informationand/or mechanisms may also be used as circumstances warrant.

FIG. 2 also illustrates a DID document 210 that is associated with theDID 205. As will be explained in more detail to follow, the DID document210 may be generated at the time that the DID 205 is created. In itssimplest form, the DID document 210 describes how to use the DID 205.Accordingly, the DID document 210 includes a reference to the DID 205,which is the DID that is described by the DID document 210. In someembodiments, the DID document 210 may be implemented according tomethods specified by a distributed ledger 220 (such as blockchain) thatwill be used to store a representation of the DID 205 as will beexplained in more detail to follow. Thus, the DID document 210 may havedifferent methods depending on the specific distributed ledger.

The DID document 210 also includes the public key 207 created by the DIDowner 201 or some other equivalent cryptographic information. The publickey 207 may be used by third party entities that are given permission bythe DID owner 201 to access information and data owned by the DID owner201. The public key 207 may also be used to verify that the DID owner201 in fact owns or controls the DID 205.

The DID document 210 may also include authentication information 211.The authentication information 211 may specify one or more mechanisms bywhich the DID owner 201 is able to prove that the DID owner 201 owns theDID 205. In other words, the mechanisms of the authenticationinformation 211 may show proof of a binding between the DID 205 (andthus its DID owner 201) and the DID document 210. In one embodiment, theauthentication information 211 may specify that the public key 207 beused in a signature operation to prove the ownership of the DID 205.Alternatively, or in addition, the authentication information 211 mayspecify that the public key 207 be used in a biometric operation toprove ownership of the DID 205. Accordingly, the authenticationinformation 211 may include any number of mechanisms by which the DIDowner 201 is able to prove that the DID owner 201 owns the DID 205.

The DID document 210 may also include authorization information 212. Theauthorization information 212 may allow the DID owner 201 to authorizethird party entities the rights to modify the DID document 210 or somepart of the document without giving the third party the right to proveownership of the DID 205. For example, the authorization information 212may allow the third party to update any designated set of one or morefields in the DID document 210 using any designated update mechanism.Alternatively, the authorization information may allow the third partyto limit the usages of DID 205 by the DID owner 201 for a specified timeperiod. This may be useful when the DID owner 201 is a minor child andthe third party is a parent or guardian of the child. The authorizationinformation 212 may allow the parent or guardian to limit use of the DIDowner 201 until such time as the child is no longer a minor.

The authorization information 212 may also specify one or moremechanisms that the third party will need to follow to prove they areauthorized to modify the DID document 210. In some embodiments, thesemechanisms may be similar to those discussed previously with respect tothe authentication information 211.

The DID document 210 may also include one or more service endpoints 213.

A service endpoint may include a network address at which a serviceoperates on behalf of the DID owner 201. Examples of specific servicesinclude discovery services, social networks, file storage services suchas identity servers or hubs, and verifiable claim repository services.Accordingly, the service endpoints 213 operate as pointers for theservices that operate on behalf of the DID owner 201. These pointers maybe used by the DID owner 201 or by third party entities to access theservices that operate on behalf of the DID owner 201. Specific examplesof service endpoints 213 will be explained in more detail to follow.

The DID document 210 may further include identification information 214.

The identification information 214 may include personally identifiableinformation such as the name, address, occupation, family members, age,hobbies, interests, or the like of DID owner 201. Accordingly, theidentification information 214 listed in the DID document 210 mayrepresent a different persona of the DID owner 201 for differentpurposes.

A persona may be pseudo anonymous. As an example, the DID owner 201 mayinclude a pen name in the DID document when identifying him or her as awriter posting articles on a blog. A persona may be fully anonymous. Asan example, the DID owner 201 may only want to disclose his or her jobtitle or other background data (e.g., a school teacher, an FBI agent, anadult older than 21 years old, etc.) but not his or her name in the DIDdocument. As yet another example, a persona may be specific to who theDID owner 201 is as an individual. As an example, the DID owner 201 mayinclude information identifying him or her as a volunteer for aparticular charity organization, an employee of a particularcorporation, an award winner of a particular award, and so forth.

The DID document 210 may also include credential information 215, whichmay also be referred to herein as an attestation. The credentialinformation 215 may be any information that is associated with the DIDowner 201's background. For instance, the credential information 215 maybe (but not limited to) a qualification, an achievement, a governmentID, a government right such as a passport or a driver's license, apayment provider or bank account, a university degree or othereducational history, employment status and history, or any otherinformation about the DID owner 201's background.

The DID document 210 may also include various other information 216. Insome embodiments, the other information 216 may include metadataspecifying when the DID document 210 was created and/or when it was lastmodified. In other embodiments, the other information 216 may includecryptographic proofs of the integrity of the DID document 210. In stillfurther embodiments, the other information 216 may include additionalinformation that is either specified by the specific method implementingthe DID document or desired by the DID owner 201.

FIG. 2 also illustrates a distributed ledger 220. The distributed ledger220 may be any decentralized, distributed network that includes variouscomputing systems that are in communication with each other. Forexample, the distributed ledger 220 may include a first distributedcomputing system 230, a second distributed computing system 240, a thirddistributed computing system 250, and any number of additionaldistributed computing systems as illustrated by the ellipses 260. Thedistributed ledger 220 may operate according to any known standards ormethods for distributed ledgers. Examples of conventional distributedledgers that may correspond to the distributed ledger 220 include, butare not limited to, Bitcoin [BTC], Ethereum, and Litecoin.

In the context of DID 205, the distributed ledger or blockchain 220 isused to store a representation of the DID 205 that points to the DIDdocument 210. In some embodiments, the DID document 210 may be stored onthe actual distributed ledger. Alternatively, in other embodiments theDID document 210 may be stored in a data storage (not illustrated) thatis associated with the distributed ledger 220.

As mentioned, a representation of the DID 205 is stored on eachdistributed computing system of the distributed ledger 220. For example,in FIG. 2 this is shown as DID hash 231, DID hash 241, and DID hash 251,which are ideally identical hashed copies of the same DID. The DID hash231, DID hash 241, and DID hash 251 may then point to the location ofthe DID document 210. The distributed ledger or blockchain 220 may alsostore numerous other representations of other DIDs as illustrated byreferences 232, 233, 234, 242, 243, 244, 252, 253, and 254.

In one embodiment, when the DID owner 201 creates the DID 205 and theassociated DID document 210, the DID hash 231, DID hash 241, and DIDhash 251 are written to the distributed ledger 220. The distributedledger 220 thus records that the DID 205 now exists. Since thedistributed ledger 220 is decentralized, the DID 205 is not under thecontrol of any entity outside of the DID owner 201. DID hash 231, DIDhash 241, and DID hash 251 may each include, in addition to the pointerto the DID document 210, a record or time stamp that specifies when theDID 205 was created. At a later date, when modifications are made to theDID document 210, each modification (and potentially also a timestamp ofthe modification) may also be recorded in DID hash 231, DID hash 241,and DID hash 251. DID hash 231, DID hash 241, and DID hash 251 mayfurther include a copy of the public key 207 so that the DID 205 iscryptographically bound to the DID document 210.

Having described DIDs and how they operate generally with reference toFIG. 2, specific embodiments of DID environments will now be explained.Turning to FIG. 3, an environment 300 that may be used to performvarious DID management operations and services will now be explained. Itwill be appreciated that the environment of FIG. 3 may referenceelements from FIG. 2 as needed for ease of explanation.

As shown in FIG. 3, the environment 300 may include various devices andcomputing systems that may be owned or otherwise under the control ofthe DID owner 201. These may include a user device 301. The user device301 may be, but is not limited to, a mobile device such as a smartphone, a computing device such as a laptop computer, or any device suchas a car or an appliance that includes computing abilities. The device301 may include a web browser 302 operating on the device and anoperating system 303 operating the device. More broadly speaking, thedashed line 304 represents that all of these devices may be owned orotherwise under the control of the DID owner 201.

The environment 300 also includes a DID management module 320. It willbe noted that in operation, the DID management module 320 may reside onand be executed by one or more of user device 301, web browser 302, andthe operating system 303 as illustrated by respective lines 301 a, 302a, and 303 a. Accordingly, the DID management module 320 is shown asbeing separate for ease of explanation.

As shown in FIG. 3, the DID management module 320 includes a DIDcreation module 330. The DID creation module 330 may be used by the DIDowner 201 to create the DID 205 or any number of additional DIDs, suchas DID 331. In one embodiment, the DID creation module may include orotherwise have access to a User Interface (UI) element 335 that mayguide the DID owner 201 in creating the DID 205. The DID creation module330 may have one or more drivers that are configured to work withspecific distributed ledgers such as distributed ledger 220 so that theDID 205 complies with the underlying methods of that distributed ledger.

A specific embodiment will now be described. For example, the UI 335 mayprovide a prompt for the user to enter a user name or some other humanrecognizable name. This name may be used as a display name for the DID205 that will be generated. As previously described, the DID 205 may bea long string of random numbers and letters and so having ahuman-recognizable name for a display name may be advantageous. The DIDcreation module 330 may then generate the DID 205. In the embodimentshaving the UI 335, the DID 205 may be shown in a listing of identitiesand may be associated with the human-recognizable name.

The DID creation module 330 may also include a key generation module350. The key generation module may generate the private key 206 andpublic key 207 pair previously described. The DID creation module 330may then use the DID 205 and the private and public key pair to generatethe DID document 210.

In operation, the DID creation module 330 accesses a registrar 310 thatis configured to the specific distributed ledger that will be recordingthe transactions related to the DID 205. The DID creation module 330uses the registrar 310 to record DID hash 231, DID hash 241, and DIDhash 251 in the distributed ledger in the manner previously described,and to store the DID document 210 in the manner previously described.This process may use the public key 207 in the hash generation.

In some embodiments, the DID management module 320 may include anownership module 340. The ownership module 340 may provide mechanismsthat ensure that the DID owner 201 is in sole control of the DID 205. Inthis way, the provider of the DID management module 320 is able toensure that the provider does not control the DID 205, but is onlyproviding the management services.

As previously discussed, the key generation module 350 generates theprivate key 206 and public key 207 pair and the public key 207 is thenrecorded in the DID document 210. Accordingly, the public key 207 may beused by all devices associated with the DID owner 201 and all thirdparties that desire to provide services to the DID owner 201.Accordingly, when the DID owner 201 desires to associate a new devicewith the DID 205, the DID owner 201 may execute the DID creation module330 on the new device. The DID creation module 330 may then use theregistrar 310 to update the DID document 210 to reflect that the newdevice is now associated with the DID 205, which update would bereflected in a transaction on the distributed ledger 220, as previouslydescribed.

In some embodiments, however, it may be advantageous to have a publickey per device 301 owned by the DID owner 201 as this may allow the DIDowner 201 to sign with the device-specific public key without having toaccess a general public key. In other words, since the DID owner 201will use different devices at different times (for example using amobile phone in one instance and then using a laptop computer in anotherinstance), it is advantageous to have a key associated with each deviceto provide efficiencies in signing using the keys. Accordingly, in suchembodiments the key generation module 350 may generate additional publickeys 208 and 209 when the additional devices execute the DID creationmodule 330. These additional public keys may be associated with theprivate key 206 or in some instances may be paired with a new privatekey.

In those embodiments where the additional public keys 208 and 209 areassociated with different devices, the additional public keys 208 and209 may be recorded in the DID document 210 as being associated withthose devices. This is shown in FIG. 3. It will be appreciated that theDID document 210 may include the information (information 205, 207 and211 through 216) previously described in relation to FIG. 2 in additionto the information (information 208, 209 and 365) shown in FIG. 3. Ifthe DID document 210 existed prior to the device-specific public keysbeing generated, then the DID document 210 would be updated by thecreation module 330 via the registrar 310 and this would be reflected inan updated transaction on the distributed ledger 220.

In some embodiments, the DID owner 201 may desire to keep secret theassociation of a device with a public key or the association of a devicewith the DID 205. Accordingly, the DID creation module 330 may causethat such data be secretly shown in the DID document 210.

As described thus far, the DID 205 has been associated with all thedevices under the control of the DID owner 201, even when the deviceshave their own public keys. However, in some embodiments it may beuseful for each device or some subset of devices under the control ofthe DID owner 201 to each have their own DID. Thus, in some embodimentsthe DID creation module 330 may generate an additional DID, for exampleDID 331, for each device. The DID creation module 330 would thengenerate private and public key pairs and DID documents for each of thedevices and have them recorded on the distributed ledger 220 in themanner previously described. Such embodiments may be advantageous fordevices that may change ownership as it may be possible to associate thedevice-specific DID to the new owner of the device by granting the newowner authorization rights in the DID document and revoking such rightsfrom the old owner.

As mentioned, to ensure that the private key 206 is totally in thecontrol of the DID owner 201, the private key 206 is created on the userdevice 301, browser 302, or operating system 303 that is owned orcontrolled by the DID owner 201 that executed the DID management module320. In this way, there is little chance that a third party (and mostconsequentially, the provider of the DID management module 320) may gaincontrol of the private key 206.

However, there is a chance that the device storing the private key 206may be lost by the DID owner 201, which may cause the DID owner 201 tolose access to the DID 205. Accordingly, in some embodiments, the UI 335may include the option to allow the DID owner 201 to export the privatekey 206 to an off device secured database 305 that is under the controlof the DID owner 201. As an example, the database 305 may be one of theidentity hubs 410 described below with respect to FIG. 4. A storagemodule 380 is configured to store data (such as the private key 206 orattestations made by or about the DID owner 201) off device in thedatabase 305 or identity hubs 410. In some embodiments, the private key206 may be stored as a QR code that may be scanned by the DID owner 201.

In other embodiments, the DID management module 320 may include arecovery module 360 that may be used to recover a lost private key 206.In operation, the recovery module 360 allows the DID owner 201 to selectone or more recovery mechanisms 365 at the time the DID 205 is createdthat may later be used to recover the lost private key. In thoseembodiments having the UI 335, the UI 335 may allow the DID owner 201 toprovide information that will be used by the one or more recoverymechanisms 365 during recovery. The recovery module 360 may then be runon any device associated with the DID 205.

The DID management module 320 may also include a revocation module 370that is used to revoke or sever a device from the DID 205. In operation,the revocation module may use the UI element 335, which may allow theDID owner 201 to indicate a desire to remove a device from beingassociated with the DID 205. In one embodiment, the revocation module370 may access the DID document 210 and may cause that all references tothe device be removed from the DID document 210. Alternatively, thepublic key for the device may be removed. This change in the DIDdocument 210 may then be reflected as an updated transaction on thedistributed ledger 220 as previously described.

FIG. 4 illustrates an embodiment of an environment 400 in which a DIDsuch as DID 205 may be utilized. Specifically, the environment 400 willbe used to describe the use of the DID 205 in relation to one or moredecentralized storage devices or identity hubs 410 that are each underthe control of the DID owner 201 to store data belonging to or regardingthe DID owner 201. For instance, data may be stored within the identityhubs using the storage module 380 of FIG. 3. It will be noted that FIG.4 may include references to elements first discussed in relation to FIG.2 or 3 and thus use the same reference numeral for ease of explanation.

In one embodiment, the identity hubs 410 may be multiple instances ofthe same identity hub. This is represented by the line 410A. Thus, thevarious identity hubs 410 may include at least some of the same data andservices. Accordingly, if any change is made to one of the identity hubs410, the change may be reflected in the remaining identity hubs. Forexample, the first identity hub 411 and second identity hub 412 areimplemented in cloud storage (perhaps within the same cloud, or even ondifferent clouds managed by different cloud providers) and thus may beable to hold a large amount of data. Accordingly, a full set of the datamay be stored in these identity hubs.

However, the identity hubs 413 and 414 may have less memory space.Accordingly, in these identity hubs a descriptor of the data stored inthe first and second identity hubs may be included. Alternatively, arecord of changes made to the data in other identity hubs may beincluded. Thus, changes in one of the identity hubs 410 are either fullyreplicated in the other identity hubs or at least a record or descriptorof that data is recorded in the other identity hubs.

Because the identity hubs may be multiple instances of the same identityhub, only a full description of the first identity hub 411 will beprovided as this description may also apply to the identity hubs 412through 414. As illustrated, identity hub 411 may include data storage420. The data storage 420 may be used to store any type of data that isassociated with the DID owner 201. In one embodiment the data may be acollection 422 of a specific type of data corresponding to a specificprotocol. For example, the collection 422 may be medical records datathat corresponds to a specific protocol for medical data. The collection422 may include any other type of data, such as attestations made by orabout the DID owners 201.

In one embodiment, the stored data may have different authentication andprivacy settings 421 associated with the stored data. For example, afirst subset of the data may have a setting 421 that allows the data tobe publicly exposed, but that does not include any authentication to theDID owner 201. This type of data may be for relatively unimportant datasuch as color schemes and the like. A second subset of the data may havea setting 421 that allows the data to be publicly exposed and thatincludes authentication to the DID owner 201. A third subset of the datamay have a setting 421 that encrypts the subset of data with the privatekey 206 and public key 207 pair (or some other key pair) associated withthe DID owner 201. This type of data will require a party to have accessto the public key 207 (or to some other associated public key) in orderto decrypt the data. This process may also include authentication to theDID owner 201. A fourth subset of the data may have a setting 421 thatrestricts this data to a subset of third parties. This may require thatpublic keys associated with the subset of third parties be used todecrypt the data. For example, the DID owner 201 may cause the setting421 to specify that only public keys associated with friends of the DIDowner 201 may decrypt this data. With respect to data stored by thestorage module 380, these settings 411 may be at least partiallycomposed by the storage module 380 of FIG. 3.

In some embodiments, the identity hub 411 may have a permissions module430 that allows the DID owner 201 to set specific authorization orpermissions for third parties such as third parties 401 and 402 toaccess the identity hub. For example, the DID owner 201 may provideaccess permission to his or her spouse to all the data 420.Alternatively, the DID owner 201 may allow access to his or her doctorfor any medical records. It will be appreciated that the DID owner 201may give permission to any number of third parties to access a subset ofthe data 420. This will be explained in more detail to follow. Withrespect to data stored by the storage module 380, these accesspermissions 430 may be at least partially composed by the storage module380 of FIG. 3.

The identity hub 411 may also have a messaging module 440. In operation,the messaging module allows the identity hub to receive messages such asrequests from parties such as third parties 401 and 402 to access thedata and services of the identity hub. In addition, the messaging module440 allows the identity hub 411 to respond to the messages from thethird parties and to also communicate with a DID resolver 450. This willbe explained in more detail to follow. The ellipses 416 represent thatthe identity hub 411 may have additional services as circumstanceswarrant.

In one embodiment, the DID owner 201 may wish to authenticate a newdevice 301 with the identity hub 411 that is already associated with theDID 205 in the manner previously described. Accordingly, the DID owner201 may utilize the DID management module 320 associated with the newuser device 301 to send a message to the identity hub 411 asserting thatthe new user device is associated with the DID 205 of the DID owner 201.

However, the identity hub 411 may not initially recognize the new deviceas being owned by the DID owner 201. Accordingly, the identity hub 411may use the messaging module 440 to contact the DID resolver 450. Themessage sent to the DID resolver 450 may include the DID 205.

The DID resolver 450 may be a service, application, or module that isconfigured in operation to search the distributed ledger 220 for DIDdocuments associated with DIDs. Accordingly, in the embodiment the DIDresolver 450 may search the distributed ledger 220 using the DID 205,which may result in the DID resolver 450 finding the DID document 210.The DID document 210 may then be provided to the identity hub 411.

As discussed previously, the DID document 210 may include a public key208 or 209 that is associated with the new user device 301. To verifythat the new user device is owned by the DID owner 201, the identity hub411 may provide a cryptographic challenge to the new user device 301using the messaging module 440. This cryptographic challenge will bestructured such that only a device having access to the private key 206will be able to successfully answer the challenge.

In this embodiment, since the new user device is owned by DID owner 201and thus has access to the private key 206, the challenge may besuccessfully answered. The identity hub 411 may then record in thepermissions 430 that the new user device 301 is able to access the dataand services of the identity hub 411 and also the rest of the identityhubs 410.

It will be noted that this process of authenticating the new user device301 was performed without the need for the DID owner 201 to provide anyusername, password or the like to the provider of the identity hub 411(i.e., the first cloud storage provider) before the identity hub 411could be accessed. Rather, the access was determined in a decentralizedmanner based on the DID 205, the DID document 210, and the associatedpublic and private keys. Since these were at all times in the control ofthe DID owner 201, the provider of the identity hub 411 was not involvedand thus has no knowledge of the transaction or of any personalinformation of the DID owner 201.

In another example embodiment, the DID owner 201 may provide the DID 205to the third-party entity 401 so that the third party may access data orservices stored on the identity hub 411. For example, the DID owner 201may be a human who is at a scientific conference who desires to allowthe third party 401, who is also a human, access to his or her researchdata. Accordingly, the DID owner 201 may provide the DID 205 to thethird party 401.

Once the third party 401 has access to the DID 205, he or she may accessthe DID resolver 450 to access the DID document 210. As previouslydiscussed, the DID document 210 may include an end point 213 that is anaddress or pointer to the identity hub 411. The third party 401 may thenuse the address or pointer to access the identity hub 411.

The third party 401 may send a message to the messaging module 440asking for permission to access the research data. The messaging module440 may then send a message to the DID owner 201 asking if the thirdparty 401 should be given access to the research data. Because the DIDowner desires to provide access to this data, the DID owner 201 mayallow permission to the third party 401 and this permission may berecorded in the permissions 430.

The messaging module 440 may then message the third party 401 informingthe third party that he or she is able to access the research data. Theidentity hub 411 and the third party 401 may then directly communicateso that the third party may access the data. It will be noted that inmany cases, it will actually be an identity hub associated with thethird party 401 that communicates with the identity hub 411. However, itmay be a device of the third party 401 that does the communication.

Advantageously, the above described process allows the identity hub 411and the third party 401 to communicate and to share the data without theneed for the third party to access the identity hub 411 in theconventional manner. Rather, the communication is provisioned in thedecentralized manner using the DID 205 and the DID document 210. Thisadvantageously allows the DID owner to be in full control of theprocess.

As shown in FIG. 4, the third party 402 may also request permission foraccess to the identity hub 411 using the DID 205 and the DID document210. Accordingly, the embodiments disclosed herein allow access to anynumber of third parties to the identity hubs 410.

FIG. 5 illustrates an environment 500 in which an attestation component510 attests concerning identity information of a decentralized identity505 to a relying party. As an example, the attestation component 510 hasan attestation collection 520. This attestation collection 520 is ofidentity attestations of a decentralized identity 505 (as symbolized bythe dashed line 513). The attestation component 510 is an example of thestorage module 380 of FIG. 3, in the case of the storage module 380storing attestations. In that case, the storage module 380 would storeattestations regarding the DID owner 201 that owns the DID 205.Accordingly, the storage module 380 may be configured to make identityattestations of the DID 205. In one embodiment, the attestationcollection 520 is storage on the identity hubs 410.

In the illustrated example, the attestation collection 520 includesthree identity attestations 521, 522 and 523. However, the ellipsis 524represents that the principles described herein are not limited to thenumber of identity attestations of the decentralized identity 505 thatthe attestation component 510 can make. Furthermore, the ellipsis 524represents that the principles described herein extend to staticcollections of identity attestations, as well as dynamic collections ofidentity attestations in which the number and/or nature of identityattestations may change over time (e.g, due to removal, amendment,replacement or addition of identity attestations of the decentralizedidentity).

As represented by arrow 501, each of one, some, or all of the identityattestations in the attestation collection 520 may have been generatedby a corresponding attestation source. Thus, the environment 500 showsattestation sources 530. In FIG. 5, the attestation sources 530 areshown as including two attestation sources 531 and 532, though theellipsis 533 represents that there may be any number of attestationsources that have provided identity attestations of the decentralizedidentity 505 into the attestation collection 520.

These attestation sources 530 may be recognized authorities to makeparticular attestations. More specifically, each attestation source 530may be a computing system within the control of that particularauthority. For instance, the department of motor vehicles of aparticular governmental jurisdiction might be authorized to provide anattestation to the decentralized identity that he/she is licensed bythat particular jurisdiction to drive a commercial vehicle, along withexpiration date, and any conditions or restrictions on that license. Anagency of a nation might be authorized to provide an attestation to thedecentralized identity that he/she has a certain level of securityclearance to have access to information that is classified by thatnation. An airline might provide an attestation that the decentralizedidentity has a particular frequent flyer number and status.

On the other hand, some identity attestations might be made by the DIDowner where the DID owner is authoritative on the identity assertion.For instance, the DID owner might make attestations about his/herpreferences. As an example, the decentralized identity might attest topreferences for window or aisle seats in aircraft, preferred name, foodrestrictions (e.g, gluten-free, vegetarian, kosher, and so forth),whether they wish to be an organ donor, calendar restrictions, requestedaccommodations due to disability or religious belief, and so forth.

As represented by arrow 502, the attestation component 510 may providethese identity attestations to relying parties 540. These relyingparties 540 might request identity attestations of the decentralizedidentity 505 from the attestation component 510. Alternatively, or inaddition, the attestation component 510 may otherwise be triggered toprovide the identity attestations of the decentralized identity 505 uponthe occurrence of one or more other events.

Thus, the environment 500 shows relying parties 540. In FIG. 5, therelying parties are shown as including two relying parties 541 and 542,though the ellipsis 543 represents that there may be any number ofrelying parties that, over time, depend on the attestation component 510for identity attestations of the decentralized identity 505. The relyingparties 540 may each be computing systems that are configured tointerpret the received identity attestations and use those attestationsto make decisions (e.g., in accordance with a policy).

A relying party that depends on a particular identity attestation mightbe the same computing system as the attestation source that provided theidentity attestation for the decentralized identity in the first place.For instance, an agency of a nation might provide an attestation thatthe decentralized identity has a high security clearance, and laterrequest that attestation back when deciding whether to grant thedecentralized identity's request to access certain material.

When providing one of the identity attestations 521 through 524 to anyof the relying parties 540, the attestation component 510 may (asrepresented by line 551) cryptographically secure the attestation with aprivate key 511 of the decentralized identity 505. For instance, in thecase of the decentralized identity 505 being the DID 205, theattestation component may use the private key 206 of that DID 205 tosecure (e.g., digitally sign) the identity attestation. The relyingparty may then use the public key 207 of that DID 205 to ensure that theattestation was indeed made by the DID 205.

While the attestation component 510 uses the private key 511 tocryptographically secure (e.g., digitally sign) (as represented by line551) identity attestations of the decentralized identity 505 made torelying parties 540, the attestation component 510 uses another privatekey 512 to cryptographically secure (e.g., digitally sign) (asrepresented by line 552) attestations 560 that the attestation component510 makes to the relying parties 540 about itself.

For instance, an attestation 560 might be an integrity attestation fromwhich a relying party 540 may determine an integrity with which theattestation component 510 has managed the private key 511 of thedecentralized identity 505. As an example, for attestations about theattestation component itself, the attestation component 510 might attestabout the model, maker, security precautions, and so forth, of thatattestation component 510. Thus, a relying party can determine using thepublic key of that maker, whether they are satisfied that the identityattestations made using that private key 511 are indeed secure—and thatthe private key and/or the identity attestations have not been stolen ortampered with.

To improve security, the private key 512 of the attestation component510 is not accessible by the decentralized identity 505. For instance,the private key 512 (and any attestations signed by that private key512) may be stored in a centralized storage that is not accessible (atleast in unencrypted form) to the decentralized identity 505. As anexample, the private key 512 of the attestation component 510 is notaccessible using any private key 511 of the decentralized identity 505.In one particular example, the attestation component 510 is an owner ofa decentralized identifier that is different than the decentralizedidentity 505. As described above with respect to FIG. 2, this wouldresult in the private key 512 being created for the decentralizedidentifier that was assigned to the attestation component 510.Furthermore, that new private key 512 would be in the control of theattestation component 510.

FIG. 6 illustrates a flowchart of a method 600 for attesting concerningidentity information of an attestation component to a relying party. Themethod 600 may be performed within the environment 500 of FIG. 5.Accordingly, the method 600 of FIG. 6 will now be described withfrequent reference to the environment 500 of FIG. 5.

The method 600 includes accessing a private key of the attestationcomponent (act 601). Referring to FIG. 5, the attestation component 510gains access to its own private key 512. Furthermore, the attestationcomponent determines that an identity attestation (e.g., an integrityattestation) of the attestation component is to be provided (act 602).For instance, the attestation component 510 might determine that anattestation 560 is to be provided to relying party 541. Note that thisattestation is of the attestation component 510, and not of thedecentralized identity 505.

The attestation component's accessing of the private key 512 (act 601)may be done very early on—perhaps when the attestation component 510 wascreated. For instance, when a decentralized identifier is created forthe attestation component 510, the private key 512 may have then beencreated for the attestation component as described above for FIG. 2. Onthe other time extreme, the private key 512 might be acquired inresponse to (i.e., after) determining that an identity attestation ofthe attestation component is to be provided (act 602). Accordingly, inthe broadest principles described herein, since there is no particulartemporal dependency between the accessing of the private key of theattestation component (act 601) and the determination that an identityattestation of the attestation component is to be provided (act 602),the acts 601 and 602 are shown in parallel in FIG. 6.

In accordance with the method 600, the attestation componentcryptographically secures the identity attestation of the attestationcomponent with the private key of the attestation component (act 603).For instance, the attestation component 510 may cryptographically secure(e.g., digitally sign) each of the attestations 560 of the attestationcomponent 510 using the private key 512 of the attestation component510. This may be done very early, as soon as the attestation component510 can access the attestations 560, perhaps well before it is firstdetermined that any of the attestations 560 are to be provided to arelying party 540. On the other time extreme, the cryptographic securingof a particular attestation 560 (act 603) may be deferred until afterthat attestation 560 is determined to be provided to a relying party(act 602).

In response to a determination that the identity attestation of theattestation component is to be provided (act 602), and after theidentity attestation is cryptographically secured (act 603), theidentity attestation of the attestation component is provided to therelying party (act 604). For instance, as represented by arrow 502 inFIG. 5, the attestation component 510 provides an identity attestationabout itself (e.g., an integrity attestation) to one of the relyingparties 540 (e.g., relying party 541).

The relying party (e.g., relying party 541) then may take appropriateaction based on this identity attestation. In one example, the relyingparty 541 is the same as one of the attestation sources 530 (e.g.,attestation source 531) that provides identity attestation(s) of thedecentralized identity 505. In that case, the attestation source 531might await the receipt of the identity attestation of the attestationcomponent sent in act 604, prior to providing the identity attestationof the decentralized identity 505.

This may be particularly beneficial where the identity attestation ishighly sensitive, and the attestation source wants to be sure that thedecentralized identity can keep that attestation in a highly safe andtamper-resistant and theft-resistant manner. For instance, prior toissuing an attestation that a particular decentralized identity has highgovernment security clearance, a government agency might want to firstdetermine that the attestation component has secured the private key ofthe decentralized identity (and any attestations of the decentralizedidentity) in a secure way, and thus may want to confirm at least themaker of the attestation component.

FIG. 7 illustrates a flowchart of a method 700 for providing an identityattestation of the decentralized identity. The method 700 of FIG. 7 issimilar to the method 600 of FIG. 6. However, in FIG. 7, it is theprivate key and identity attestation of the decentralized identity thatis being operated upon. In FIG. 6, it was the private key and identityattestation of the attestation component itself that was being operatedupon.

Briefly stated, the private key (e.g., private key 511) of thedecentralized identity (e.g, decentralized identity 505) is accessed(act 701). That private key (e.g., private key 511) is then used tocryptographically secure an identity attestation (e.g., identityattestation 521) of the decentralized identity (e.g., decentralizedidentity 505) (act 703). Additionally, it is determined to send thatidentity attestation (e.g., identity attestation 521) to a relying party(e.g., relying party 541) (act 702). Then, the cryptographically securedidentity attestation (e.g., identity attestation 521) is caused to besent to the relying party (e.g., relying party 541) (act 704).

In one embodiment, the identity attestation of the decentralizedidentity is sent (act 704) to the relying party at the same time as theidentity attestation of the attestation component. For instance, arelying party may have requested the identity attestation of thedecentralized identity as well as the identity attestation of theattestation component. Alternatively, both attestations of thedecentralized identity and the attestation component may be provided bydefault, and/or in response to policy. In this case, the determinationthat the identity attestation of the attestation component is to beprovided (act 602) and the determination that the identity attestationof the decentralized identity is to be provided (act 702) may occur atabout the same time, in response to the same request, rules, and/ordefaults.

For instance, FIG. 8 illustrates that an identity attestation 560 of theattestation component 510 is signed by the private key 512 of theattestation component 510 to generate the signed identity attestation860 of the attestation component. The combination of the identityattestation 521 of the decentralized identity 505 and the signedidentity attestation 860 are then signed by the private key 511 of thedecentralized identity 505. A relying party may then use the public keyof the decentralized identity to verify that the combination came fromthe decentralized identity, and may then use the public key of theattestation component to verify that the identity attestation of theattestation component came from the attestation component (and was theidentity information of the decentralized identity was properly securedbased on that identity information of the attestation component).

Accordingly, the principles described herein provide improved securityfor working with attestations in the context of decentralizedidentities. For the processes and methods disclosed herein, theoperations performed in the processes and methods may be implemented indiffering order. Furthermore, the outlined operations are only providedas examples, an some of the operations may be optional, combined intofewer steps and operations, supplemented with further operations, orexpanded into additional operations without detracting from the essenceof the disclosed embodiments.

The present invention may be embodied in other specific forms withoutdeparting from its spirit or characteristics. The described embodimentsare to be considered in all respects only as illustrative and notrestrictive. The scope of the invention is, therefore, indicate by theappended claims rather than by the foregoing description. All changeswhich come within the meaning and range of equivalency of the claims areto be embraced within their scope.

What is claimed is:
 1. A computing system comprising: one or moreprocessors; and one or more computer-readable media having thereoncomputer-executable instructions that are structured such that, whenexecuted by the one or more processors, cause the computing system toperform a method for attesting concerning identity information of anattestation component to a relying party, the method comprising:accessing a private key of an attestation component that offers identityattestations of a particular decentralized identity, and that managesuse of a private key of the particular decentralized identity, theprivate key of the attestation component being different than theprivate key of the particular decentralized identity; determining thatan identity attestation of the attestation component is to be provided,the identity attestation of the attestation component being differentthan the identity attestations of the particular decentralized identity;the attestation component cryptographically securing the identityattestation of the attestation component with the private key of theattestation component; and in response to the determination that theidentity attestation of the attestation component is be provided,causing the cryptographically secured identity attestation of theattestation component to be provided to a relying party.
 2. Thecomputing system in accordance with claim 1, the identity attestation ofthe attestation component being an integrity attestation from which anintegrity with which the attestation component has managed the privatekey of the decentralized identity may be determined.
 3. The computingsystem in accordance with claim 1, one or more of the identityattestations of the particular decentralized identity being provided bythe relying party to the computing system.
 4. The computing system inaccordance with claim 3, at least one of the one or more identityattestations of the particular decentralized identity being provided bythe relying party in response to causing the cryptographically securedidentity attestation of the attestation component to be provided to therelying party.
 5. The computing system in accordance with claim 1, theprivate key of the attestation component not being accessible by theparticular decentralized identity.
 6. The computing system in accordancewith claim 1, the private key of the attestation component not beingaccessible using any private key of the particular decentralizedidentity.
 7. The computing system in accordance with claim 1, the methodfurther comprising: determining that a particular identity attestationof the particular decentralized identity is to be provided;cryptographically securing the particular identity attestation of theparticular decentralized identity with the private key of the particulardecentralized identity; and in response to the determination that theidentity attestation of the particular decentralized identity is to beprovided, causing the cryptographically secured identity attestation ofthe particular decentralized identity to be provided to the relyingparty.
 8. The computing system in accordance with claim 7, thedetermination that the identity attestation of the attestation componentis to be provided being made in response to a request from the relyingparty for the identity attestation of the attestation component, thedetermination that the particular identity attestation of the particulardecentralized identity is to be provided being made in response to arequest from the relying party for the particular identity attestationof the particular decentralized identity.
 9. The computing system inaccordance with claim 7, the attestation component cryptographicallysecuring the identity attestation of the attestation component bysigning the identity attestation of the attestation component with theprivate key of the attestation component, the cryptographic securing ofthe particular identity attestation of the particular decentralizedidentity being performed by signing with the private key of theparticular decentralized identity a combination of the particularidentity attestation of the particular decentralized identity and thesigned identity of the attestation component.
 10. The computing systemin accordance with claim 1, the attestation component being an owner ofa decentralized identifier that is different than the particulardecentralized identity, the private key of the attestation componentbeing associated with the decentralized identifier of the attestationcomponent.
 11. A method performed by a computing system for attestingconcerning identity information of an attestation component to a relyingparty, the method comprising: accessing a private key of an attestationcomponent that offers identity attestations of a particulardecentralized identity, and that manages use of a private key of theparticular decentralized identity, the private key of the attestationcomponent being different than the private key of the particulardecentralized identity; determining that an identity attestation of theattestation component is to be provided, the identity attestation of theattestation component being different than the identity attestations ofthe particular decentralized identity; the attestation componentcryptographically securing the identity attestation of the attestationcomponent with the private key of the attestation component; and inresponse to the determination that the identity attestation of theattestation component is be provided, causing the cryptographicallysecured identity attestation of the attestation component to be providedto a relying party.
 12. The method in accordance with claim 11, theidentity attestation of the attestation component being an integrityattestation from which an integrity with which the attestation componenthas managed the private key of the decentralized identity may bedetermined.
 13. The method in accordance with claim 11, one or more ofthe identity attestations of the particular decentralized identity beingprovided by the relying party to the computing system.
 14. The method inaccordance with claim 13, at least one of the one or more identityattestations of the particular decentralized identity being provided bythe relying party in response to causing the cryptographically securedidentity attestation of the attestation component to be provided to therelying party.
 15. The method in accordance with claim 11, the privatekey of the attestation component not being accessible by the particulardecentralized identity.
 16. The method in accordance with claim 11,further comprising: determining that a particular identity attestationof the particular decentralized identity is to be provided;cryptographically securing the particular identity attestation of theparticular decentralized identity with the private key of the particulardecentralized identity; and in response to the determination that theidentity attestation of the particular decentralized identity is to beprovided, causing the cryptographically secured identity attestation ofthe particular decentralized identity to be provided to the relyingparty.
 17. The method in accordance with claim 16, the determinationthat the identity attestation of the attestation component is to beprovided being made in response to a request from the relying party forthe identity attestation of the attestation component, the determinationthat the particular identity attestation of the particular decentralizedidentity is to be provided being made in response to a request from therelying party for the particular identity attestation of the particulardecentralized identity.
 18. The method in accordance with claim 16, theattestation component cryptographically securing the identityattestation of the attestation component by signing the identityattestation of the attestation component with the private key of theattestation component, the cryptographic securing of the particularidentity attestation of the particular decentralized identity beingperformed by signing with the private key of the particulardecentralized identity a combination of the particular identityattestation of the particular decentralized identity and the signedidentity of the attestation component.
 19. The method in accordance withclaim 11, the attestation component being an owner of a decentralizedidentifier that is different than the particular decentralized identity,the private key of the attestation component being associated with thedecentralized identifier of the attestation component.
 20. A computerprogram product comprising one or more computer-readable storage mediahaving thereon computer-executable instructions that are structured suchthat, when executed by one or more processors of a computing system,cause the computing system to perform a method for attesting concerningidentity information of an attestation component to a relying party, themethod comprising: accessing a private key of an attestation componentthat offers identity attestations of a particular decentralizedidentity, and that manages use of a private key of the particulardecentralized identity, the private key of the attestation componentbeing different than the private key of the particular decentralizedidentity; determining that an identity attestation of the attestationcomponent is to be provided, the identity attestation of the attestationcomponent being different than the identity attestations of theparticular decentralized identity; the attestation componentcryptographically securing the identity attestation of the attestationcomponent with the private key of the attestation component; and inresponse to the determination that the identity attestation of theattestation component is be provided, causing the cryptographicallysecured identity attestation of the attestation component to be providedto a relying party.